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ABSTRACT: An inspection and replacement policy for a protection system is described by a 
mathematical model that incorporates multiple aspects of maintenance quality. A three-state 
component failure model is assumed, with a defective state preceding failure. The quality of 
maintenance intervention is modelled by supposing that inspections may misclassify defects (false 
positives and false negatives) and further that an inspection may induce a defect. The quality of 
replacement is modelled by supposing that a component arises from a heterogeneous population, 
composed of weak and strong items and with the mixing parameter determining quality. Isolation 
valves used in water distribution systems motivate the model development, and a case study is 
considered in this context. We evaluate the impact of these aspects of the quality of maintenance upon 
cost and production losses. Defect induction is found to be a key determinant of the cost-optimal 
policy. The proposed model allows us to verify conditions that justify investment in higher quality 
maintenance, and thus to provide guidance for prioritization of this investment. 
KEYWORDS: maintenance; preparedness system; water; distribution network. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Protection systems, such as fire alarms, defibrillators, flood barriers and military defence systems, are 
typically inactive for much of their lives, and their activation is only required in specific situations 
such as emergencies (demand events). Consequently, such systems present hidden failures that are 
only detected in the case of an emergency, or through routine inspections. Moreover, an emergency 
event not contained by a failed protection system can have severe consequences, so concerns about the 
adequate maintenance of these systems are well justified. To ensure a high level of availability of 
these systems, they should be subject to regular inspection. Such concerns and the consequent 
inspection processes have been modelled (Vaurio, 1995, 1999; Jia and Christer, 2002; Cavalcante et 
al., 2011; Berrade et al., 2012, 2013, 2015). 
In general, the maintenance requirements (Dwight et al., 2012) for a system are developed in 
three steps. First, the scope of the maintenance policy is established by consideration of the types of 
actions that are appropriate for the system. Secondly, the frequency at which such actions should be 
executed is determined. This can be accomplished through subjective evaluation, as with the 
reliability centered maintenance methodology (Selvik and Aven, 2011), or through the application of 
mathematical models (Scarf, 1997) that aim to optimize a suitable evaluation criterion (Aven and 
Jensen, 1999). Finally, the requirement for resources to carry out the maintenance is specified. What is 
often ignored in this process is the impact of the quality of the resources available upon the efficacy of 
maintenance.  
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Some mathematical studies have sought to model particular aspects of maintenance quality. For 
example, Scarf et al. (2009) model the quality of component replacement by supposing that 
components are heterogeneous, that is, arising from a mixed population of strong items and weak 
items, the latter subject to premature failure. Cavalcante et al. (2011), Berrade et al. (2012, 2015), 
Scarf and Cavalcante (2012) and De Jonge et al. (2015) share this same notion. The source of 
heterogeneity may stem from variation in manufacturing or refurbishment of components, or from 
variation in the quality of the installation of components, or both. To model inspection quality, studies 
consider classification errors (false alarms and false negatives) (e.g. Okumura et al., 1996; Dagg and 
Newby, 1998; Berrade et al.; 2012, 2015; Cavalcante et al., 2017; Driessen et al., 2017). Other studies 
consider the possibility that inspections themselves induce faults or defects into the system (Scarf and 
Cavalcante; 2012; Flage, 2014). 
The objectives of this study are to evaluate the impact of these different aspects of maintenance 
quality on the performance of a protection system, to determine the conditions that warrant investment 
in higher quality maintenance, and to inform decision-making about priorities for improvement. Such 
aspects would in reality include matters relating to specialized training and available technologies.  To 
meet these objectives, we present a mathematical model that incorporates these three aspects of 
inspection and replacement quality (classification errors, defect induction, and component 
heterogeneity). Classification errors and defect induction relate to the quality of inspection. 
Component heterogeneity (variable quality of components) relates to quality of replacement which 
itself may be viewed as a kind of “defect induction” at replacement. We use the delay time concept 
(Christer, 1999) as a framework for our study and model a single-component protection system that is 
subject to periodic inspection and preventive replacement. Our approach is innovative because (i) we 
model these three aspects of maintenance quality simultaneously, and (ii) we motivate the study using 
a real case.  
The case study itself considers the maintenance of isolation valves used in a water distribution 
system. We study: the sensitivity of the policy to parameters that characterize maintenance quality; the 
effect of ignorance of some aspect of maintenance quality; and the cost-benefit of higher quality 
maintenance in the long term.  The model we develop has general applicability, although it is 
important to map the operational aspects of the system when applying the model to a real-life 
scenario. For example, maintenance of the protection system may imply downtime of the protected 
system (e.g. an emergency brake system) or may not (e.g. fire alarm).  
This paper is structured as follows. Next we develop the model, its assumptions, and the 
optimization criterion. In section 3, we describe the case study and the contextual setting that 
motivates the model development, present our results and a discussion of those. Finally, we conclude 
with some remarks about the study.  
2. THE MAINTENANCE QUALITY MODEL 
We consider a protection system that is a one-component system (a component in a socket that 
together perform an operational function) (Ascher and Feingold, 1984). The system is subject to a 
three-state failure process: the defective state precedes the failed state. Inspection reveals the state of 
the system—this is the delay time model (Christer, 1999)—although the inspection signal is subject to 
error. When the system is defective, it is still able to perform its operational function. When a 
component is replaced, the system is renewed. Downtime is defined as the period when the protection 
system is in the failed state.  
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While a two-state failure process is adequate to model the inspection of a protection system (e.g. 
Vaurio, 1999; Berrade et al., 2012; 2015), we consider a three-state model because it provides more 
information when detection of the defective state is possible and we wish to model classification 
errors related to this state. These errors are false positives (inspection indicates the system is defective 
when its true state is good) and false negatives (inspection indicates the system is good when its true 
state is defective). We assume that when the system is failed, inspection indicates the system is failed 
with probability 1. Inspections may also induce a defect. This occurs when an inspection changes the 
state of the system from good to defective.  
From new, M inspections are scheduled with inspection interval T. When an inspection indicates a 
defect or failure, the component is replaced. Replacement is scheduled at the M-th inspection 
regardless of the state of the system (see Vaurio, 1999). The policy thus has two decision variables (M 
and T), and pure inspection (M = ∞) and age-based replacement (M = 1) are special cases. 
The model is established in a general context where there are demand events of different types (of 
different levels of severity in practice), and the consequent costs and production losses are different. 
Also, demands incur a cost and production loss even when the protection system is operational. 
However, when the protection system is failed on demand, additional costs (in the manner of penalty 
costs) (Christer and Scarf, 1994) and losses are incurred. Costs and losses are accumulated in two 
separate decision criteria. 
2.1. Notation 
X time to defect arrival – random variable 
H delay-time, that is, the time or sojourn in the defective state – random variable 
Z State of the protection system, Z {G,D,F} , and the operational state is O={G,D} 
Xf , XF XR  For X, the probability density, distribution and reliability functions 
Hf , HF HR  For H. the probability density, distribution and reliability functions 
M scheduled number of inspections until replacement 
T time interval between cessation of one inspection and commencement of the next 
EC expected total cost of inspection and replacement in a renewal cycle 
EL expected length of a renewal cycle (cycle length) 
ED expected downtime in a renewal cycle   
ES expected total duration of inspection and replacement in a renewal
 
cycle 
ESh expected shortage in a renewal cycle 
P mixture parameter (proportion of weak items) 
W probability of false positive at an inspection 
Q probability of false negative at an inspection 
R probability of defect induction at an inspection 
IS  time required to complete an inspection  
ZS  time required to replace a component when the system state is Z, Z {G,D,F}  
Ic  cost of an inspection  
Zc  cost of a replacement when the system state is Z, Z {G,D,F}  
C∞ long-run cost per unit of time, or cost-rate 
Sh∞ long-run production loss per unit of time, or loss-rate  
k  index specifying the type of demand  
k  rate of occurrence of demand of type k  
kCUD  extra costs incurred due to a type k unmet demand  
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OD  production loss-rate on demand when system is operational ( Z {G,D} O  )  
FD  production loss-rate on demand when system is F 
MD  production loss-rate during maintenance 
,OkT  Downtime when type k demand occurs and system is operational ( Z O ).  
,FkT  Downtime when type k demand occurs and system is F 
2.2. List of model assumptions 
1. The system is renewed when the component is replaced. 
2. The time to defect arrival X has a mixture distribution 1 2( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )Xf x pf x p f x   . 
3. The time to defect arrival X and delay time H are statistically independent. 
4. A defect induced at an inspection can only be detected at a subsequent inspection. 
5. Defect induction does not occur when the protection system is operated on demand. 
6. There are no classification errors regarding identification of a failed state, that is 
Pr(F,G) Pr(G,F) 0  , where 1 2Pr(Z ,Z )  is the probability that an inspection reports the 
system state as 1Z  when the true system state is 2Z . 
7. The protection system does not age during inspection. 
8. At the scheduled replacement at age MT the protection system is inspected. We justify this on 
the basis that the system operator would wish to know the system state at the point of 
replacement. 
9. Demand events (external to the protection system itself) of type k arise according to a Poisson 
process with rate k , (independent), and an unmet demand of type k (protection system 
failed) incurs a cost kCUD  1,...,k m . 
10. Operation of the protection system on demand takes non-negligible time ,ZkT  that depends on 
the demand type and the state of the protection system. During this time downtime accrues. 
Further, production is lost at rate ,ZkD  during this downtime. Also, we assume that the 
downtime when the system is good or defective are the same, so that ,O ,G ,D ,Fk k k kT T T T   , 
and the losses do not depend on the demand type or whether the system is good or defective, 
so that 
1 2,Z ,Z Zk k
D D D   for all 1k  and 2k  and Z, and O G D FD D D D   . 
11. The durations of an inspection and a repair are known constants 
12. The protection system is available during inspection and replacement, so that downtime is not 
accruing. Thus we suppose that maintenance execution times are non-negligible but that in the 
event of a demand for the system during maintenance the operational function of the protection 
system is available, via some alternate provision. However, production is lost at rate MD  during 
maintenance.  
 
2.3. Model development 
Calculations proceed by determining the probabilities of all possible disjoint replacement (renewal) 
events, which we call scenarios (Figure 1), and their respective costs and durations. To verify that 
these are disjoint and exhaustive (so that these events partition the sample space), we check that their 
probabilities sum to 1. Note that some scenarios arise only when  1M  . 
 Scenario 1 – replacement at a true positive inspection ( 1M  )  
A defect arises naturally in the j-th interval between inspections or is induced at the j-th inspection, 
and the i-th inspection (j ≤ i < M) is positive (the inspection signal is D), and the component is 
replaced. This occurs with probability 
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Figure 1. Schematics for each of the renewal scenarios; ○ defect arrival, ● failure. 
 
 Scenario 2 – replacement on failure following a sequence of  false negatives ( 1M  ) 
A defect arises in the j-th interval between inspections or is induced at the j-th inspection, is not 
detected at subsequent inspections, and fails, and the component is replaced (renewal) at the  (i+1)-th 
inspection (i < M).  This occurs with probability 
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 Scenario 3 – replacement on to failure following no false negatives ( 1M  )  
A defect arises naturally after the i-th inspection or is induced at the i-th inspection and failure occurs 
before the (i+1)-th inspection (i < M). This occurs with probability 
( 1).
1
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 Scenario 4 – failure before the first inspection (any M) 
Failure occurs before the first inspection due to a defect that arises naturally. This occurs with 
probability  
4
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and the time duration of maintenance actions is 4 I F 4( ) ( ) ( )ES T S S P T  . 
 Scenario 5 – replacement at a false positive (M > 1) 
At the i-th inspection (i < M) a false positive occurs and the system is renewed with probability 
1 1
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 Scenario 6 – Replacement of a defective system at MT (any M) 
A defect arises naturally in the j-th interval between inspections or is induced at the j-th inspection and 
survives until the M-th inspection. This occurs with probability 
1 1
6
( 1)
1
1
1 1
1
( , ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
( )(1 ) (1 ) {( ) },
M jT
j j M j
X H
j T
j
M
j j M j
X H
j
P T M r w q f x R MT x dx
R jT r r w q R M j T
  



  

   
   
 

  (for M > 1), 
6
0
( , ) ( ) ( )
T
X HP T M f x R MT x dx   , 
(for M = 1), 
noting that if 1M   no defect can be induced. The maintenance cost is 
6 I 6( , ) ( ) ( , )dEC T M c Mc P T M  , the cycle length is 6 I D 6( , ) { ( ) } ( , )EL T M M T S S P T M   , the 
downtime is 6 ( , ) 0ED T M  , and the duration of maintenance actions is 
6 I D 6( , ) ( ) ( , )ES T M MS S P T M  . 
 Scenario 7 – replacement of a good system at MT (any M)  
In this scenario, a defect does not arise (naturally or induced) before  MT and the system is replaced, 
with probability 
1 1
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2.4 Determining the cost-rate 
The expectation of a quantity of interest ( , )EQ T M  is 
7
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the expectation over each of the scenarios, where EQ corresponds in turn to: the expected maintenance 
cost in a renewal cycle, EC; the cycle length, EL; the expected downtime in a renewal cycle, ED; and 
the expected duration of maintenance actions in a renewal cycle, ES. Then, considering additionally 
the expected rate of accumulation of cost of unmet demand when the system is down, 
1
m
k kk
CUD
 ,  
the cost-rate (our optimization criterion) is 
1
( , ) ( , )
( , )
( , )
m
k kk
EC T M ED T M CUD
C T M
EL T M






. 
 
9 
2.5 Auxiliary criterion 
Additionally we consider the loss-rate (the long-run production loss per unit time). This is expressed 
generally, although in the context of the case study that follows we regard these “production losses” as 
the loss of water supply to customers of the distribution network. In general the total expected loss in 
a renewal cycle is  
  ,O O1
,F F M1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) .
m
k kk
m
k kk
ESh T M EL T M ED T M ES T M T D
ED T M T D ES T M D




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 


 
Note that the three terms in this expression relate to losses due to demands that occur when the 
system is operational, losses due to demands that occur when the system is failed, and losses due to 
maintenance of the system, respectively. The loss rate is then 
( , )
( , )
( , )
ESh T M
Sh T M
EL T M
  . 
2.6 Adapting the model to other contexts 
Depending on the context of application, assumption 12 deserves special attention. In Berrade et al. 
(2012), this assumption takes the opposite form (during replacement the protection system is down), 
but to adapt our model to this opposite assumption, it suffices to calculate the expected downtime as 
(ED + ES). Assumption 7 can relaxed by considering T as including SI (T > SI) and removing SI  from 
the expressions for EL. The model presented can also be modified for protection systems in simpler 
contexts: components arising from homogeneous population, p = 0; no classification errors, w = q = 
0; no defect induction, r = 0; perfect inspection, w = q = r = 0. Further, by defining w = 0 and q = 1 
we model renewal only on failure, assuming no error in identifying the failed state. Finally, when the 
system has only two possible states (operational and failed) and is subject to perfect inspection, it 
suffices to define w = q = r = 0 in the scenarios 3, 4 and 7 and setting FH(h) = 1 for all h. 
3 THE CASE OF ISOLATION VALVES 
3.1 Context 
The impact of isolation valves upon the reliability of water distribution systems (Kim and Mays, 
1994) depends on the design of the isolation system and the reliability of the valves themselves. Many 
studies have considered the former (e.g., Walski, 1993; Jun et al., 2007; Giustolisi and Savic, 2010) 
but few consider the latter (Liu et al., 2017). Isolation valves are protection systems. Their operation is 
required to isolate part of the network (segment) only in the event of, for example, leakage, repair, or 
contamination. When a demand event occurs (on demand) and the required valves are fully functional, 
a segment is isolated with little delay, leaving only a limited number of clients without service and 
avoiding greater damage to the network. On the other hand, if a valve is failed (not functional) on 
demand, isolation is delayed causing greater loss of supply and, depending on the operational pressure 
in the segment, flooding and erosion (Figure 2), and adjacent segments must be isolated, leaving a 
greater number of customers without service. 
The function of isolation valves is even more critical for controlling contamination events, which 
have a greater impact on service disruption, environmental damage, and cost. A complicating aspect is 
that isolation system design (the location of isolation valves in the network) renders some values more 
critical than others, and so the maintenance requirements may vary across identical valves.  
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An isolation valve is regarded as failed when it cannot be closed. In common with mechanical 
equipment, the physical condition or “state” of a valve declines over time due to factors such as 
corrosion, fatigue, wear and accumulation of debris, the deterioration rate depending on the specific 
operational conditions of the valve (Marlow et al., 2012). In our study for a Brazilian sanitation 
company, the most failure-prone component is the reduction mechanism of the valve activation 
system. This wears relatively quickly and it is more sensitive to factors related to maintenance quality. 
Such components are used in valves of large nominal diameter and high operating pressure. 
Furthermore, in practice, prior to failure, the valve presents as defective, that is, even though it can 
fulfill its operational function, it shows warning signs of imminent failure such as resistance to closure 
or small passage of water on closure. Information about the state of the valve can be obtained at 
inspection.  
 
 
Figure 2. Major erosion resulting from a broken water pipeline in Brazil. 
 
At an inspection, closure of the valve is attempted by an inspector and downstream water-flow is 
measured. The impact of inspection upon the operation of the network is negligible. Repair of a valve 
on the other hand requires isolation of the valve from the network, causing the network (the protected 
system) to be partially unavailable. This partial unavailability is somewhat different to the notion of 
risk of a demand for the protection system not being met when it is subject to maintenance. 
Discussion with network engineers revealed some important aspects of inspection: 
(1) On closure, low flow rate through the valve is difficult to detect. The pressure gauges show 
pressure differences when water flow is high enough to fill the pipe’s transverse section, which 
happens when the valve is failed (classification error).  
(2) The perception of the resistance when closing a valve (a characteristic of defective valves) varies 
among inspectors (classification error). Nonetheless, it is possible to determine when a valve 
cannot be fully closed (failed valve). 
(3) The use of tools such as levers to close the valves more easily is common practice. This practice 
can damage components of the activation mechanism of the valve (Figure 3) (defect induction). 
Points (1) and (2) suggest that classification errors occur when a valve is defective, but not when it is 
failed. Further, point (3) suggests that inspection can induce the defect state.  
On operation of the valves on demand, the probability of an induced defect is practically zero, 
since a larger and better prepared crew is mobilized for such operations. In this way, better quality 
maintenance is more costly (e.g. Zyl, 2014). In the event of a demand or maintenance (here 
represented specially by the replacement of the gear reducer), a volume of water is not delivered to a 
group of customers (a shortage or loss), and the severity of this loss depends on when the event 
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occurs, the values operated, and their operational states. Losses are calculated for a typical valve. The 
loss criterion, Sh∞, is volume of water not supplied per unit of time.  
 
           
Figure 3. Left, schematic of a gear reducer in a butterfly valve, and right, endless thread damage due 
to use of excessive force in closure.  
3.2 Specification of the parameters 
We study an isolation valve in a water distribution network that is installed in a high-pressure 
pipeline, located in an easily accessible site. The segments adjacent to that valve have a high risk for 
contamination. The parameter estimates we use are based on expert knowledge obtained from the 
engineers of the network operator and maintainer. Approximately 10% of the valve components are 
either poorly installed or returned to inventory with a fault at installation (p = 0.1). Inspection 
parameters were set at w = 0.05 (false positive), q = 0.3 (false negative) and r = 0.05 (defect 
induction). The unit of time is set to 1 year. Weibull distributions are used for  X (weak 
1  = 1, 1  = 2; 
strong 
2  = 4, 2 =3) and H is exponential with mean 3  = 0.5 .  
The time durations of replacements are not state dependent and G D F 1S S S    day. The time 
duration of inspection is assumed to be zero ( I 0S  ). 
We simplify demand and network segmentation into two kinds of demand (leaks and 
contamination) and known consequences, depending of the operational state, representing an average 
valve among those observed. Demands are Poisson processes (Goulter and Coals, 1986). We set the 
type 1 demand (leaks) rate to 
1  = 3.042 (one demand every 120 days), and the type 2 demand 
(contamination) rate to 
2  = 0.5 (one every 2 years). On demand, the loss-rate is 25.000 m³/day for an 
operational valve ( OD ) and 50.000 m³/day for a failed valve ( FD ). The downtimes for operational 
valves are 1 day for a type 1 demand ( 1,OT ) and 2 days for type 2 demand ( 2,OT ), and for failed valves 
they are 2 days ( 1,FT ) and 4 days ( 2,FT ) respectively. For replacement, the loss-rate is 50.000 m³/day (
MD ) regardless of the state of the system at replacement.  
Costs are relative to the cost of preventive replacement of a good valve, so that Gc = 1 unit.  The 
other costs were: Ic  = 0.04 (inspection), and Dc  = 1.4 and Fc  = 2 for replacement of defective and 
failed valves respectively. The extra costs resulting from an unmet demand are 
1CUD  = 20 (leaks) and 
2CUD  = 50 (contamination). These are penalty costs in the sense of Christer and Scarf (1994) relating 
to additional loss of supply, cost of containment, and other impacts (e.g. extensive damage to the 
network and the environment). 
3.3 Results and discussion 
The results are discussed in three parts. Firstly, we evaluate the effects of different aspects of 
maintenance quality upon optimal policy. Secondly, we evaluate the effects of ignoring these aspects 
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of quality in turn, and thus demonstrate the utility of our general model. Finally, we investigate 
circumstances that would justify investing in higher quality maintenance. 
3.3.1 Evaluation of the effects of different aspects of maintenance quality  
The base case is highlighted on line 1 of Table 1, and quality parameters are varied thereafter. In each 
case, we present the cost-optimal (M,T) policy, the cost-optimal (M=1,T) policy (age based 
replacement, ABR) and the cost-optimal (M=∞,T) policy (pure inspection, PI). The secondary 
criterion, the loss or shortage is also presented.  
In the base case, the ABR policy is globally optimal as the quality of inspection is such that 
inspection is detrimental. When we vary the maintenance quality parameters, the optimal policy 
appears to oscillate between ABR and PI or a policy near PI (MT policy for large M). We can see this 
effect in Figure 4, noting there that when M=1, the cost-rate does not depend on the value of the 
inspection parameters (r, w, and q) because there is no inspection in this case. The cost-optimality of 
PI would be doubtful however when there exist classification errors regarding failure, since downtime 
would not be limited by the length of the inspection interval. Detailed analysis of this point would 
require a different study. Further, looking at the optimal ABR policy, this is strongly influenced by the 
mixture parameter p but cannot be influenced by the inspection quality parameters. This demonstrates 
that the MT policy is interesting to study because it offers insights to aspects of quality that the 
simpler policies do not. Nonetheless, a policy that is simpler to implement (ABR)) might be used by 
the water distribution company. Furthermore, a block replacement policy (even simpler to implement) 
may be near cost-optimal, and so might be implemented.  
 
Table 1. Comparison of optimal policies for various values of the quality parameters. Sh∞ in 10
5
m
3
. 
  
Quality parameters  Optimal MT policy 
 
 Optimal ABR 
policy (M=1) 
 Optimal PI policy 
(M=∞) 
 Case p w q r  M T MT C∞* Sh∞  T C∞* Sh∞  T C∞* Sh∞ 
1 Base case 0.10 0.05 0.30 0.05  1 0.785 0.785 1.856 1.659  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.151 2.036 1.399 
2 Worse p 0.15 0.05 0.30 0.05  1 0.703 0.703 2.070 1.734  0.703 2.070 1.734  0.149 2.086 1.412 
3 Worse p 0.20 0.05 0.30 0.05  24 0.151 3.624 2.134 1.425  0.649 2.240 1.794  0.147 2.138 1.426 
4 Better p 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05  1 0.929 0.929 1.561 1.559  0.929 1.561 1.559  0.152 1.988 1.388 
5 Best p 0 0.05 0.30 0.05  1 1.239 1.239 1.072 1.419  1.239 1.072 1.419  0.154 1.942 1.376 
6 Worse r 0.10 0.05 0.30 0.10  1 0.785 0.785 1.856 1.659  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.150 2.936 1.525 
7 Better r 0.10 0.05 0.30 0.03  20 0.162 3.240 1.644 1.353  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.150 1.661 1.351 
8 Better r 0.10 0.05 0.30 0.01  15 0.184 2.760 1.253 1.314  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.148 1.282 1.303 
9 Best r 0.10 0.05 0.30 0  17 0.178 3.026 1.051 1.288  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.147 1.090 1.280 
10 Worse w 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.05  1 0.785 0.785 1.856 1.659  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.180 2.180 1.466 
11 Best w 0.10 0 0.30 0.05  1 0.785 0.785 1.856 1.659  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.124 1.861 1.312 
12 Worse q 0.10 0.05 0.50 0.05  1 0.785 0.785 1.856 1.659  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.138 2.239 1.422 
13 Better q 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.05  1 0.785 0.785 1.856 1.659  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.164 1.878 1.379 
14 Best q 0.10 0.05 0 0.05  20 0.178 3.560 1.805 1.371  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.172 1.810 1.369 
15 Better w and q 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.05  25 0.145 3.625 1.749 1.319  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.140 1.753 1.316 
16 Best w and q 0.10 0 0 0.05  25 0.146 3.650 1.656 1.295  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.140 1.659 1.291 
17 Ignoring defects 0.10 0 1 0.05  1 0.785 0.785 1.856 1.659  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.092 3.276 1.358 
18 Ignoring defects, worse r 0.10 0 1 0.10  1 0.785 0.785 1.856 1.659  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.083 4.688 1.500 
19 Ignoring defects, better r 0.10 0 1 0.01  14 0.133 1.862 1.687 1.321  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.086 1.775 1.255 
20 Ignoring defects, best r 0.10 0 1 0  20 0.109 2.180 1.309 1.264  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.084 1.341 1.229 
21 Perfect inspection 0.10 0 0 0  20 0.164 3.280 0.818 1.197  0.785 1.856 1.659  0.134 0.838 1.175 
22 Perfect maintenance 0 0 0 0  15 0.192 2.880 0.749 1.201  1.239 1.072 1.419  0.130 0.800 1.165 
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Focusing now on detail, we see (lines 1 to 5) that the smaller is p the more competitive is ABR 
compared to PI. This is as expected since inspection is useful if early failures are likely and only if 
inspections themselves are effective (small classification errors) and efficient (no defect induction). 
Indeed for r ≥ 0.05 the ABR policy is the recommended. This becomes even more evident when there 
is a combined effect of defect induction and false negatives (line 12): with no false negatives (q = 0), 
PI is preferred (line 14). The difference is small nonetheless, evidencing the greater impact of defect 
induction (lines 1 and 6-9, 0.01 change in r has a 9% effect on the cost-rate).  
Variation in w (false positives) (lines 1 and 10,11) has little effect on the MT policy and 
influences T in PI (larger T for larger w).  Variation in q (false negatives) (lines 1 and 12-14) we see 
the opposite (smaller T for larger q). These observations concur with those in Berrade et al. (2012). 
These opposing effects appear to cancel one another (cases 15, 16). So defect induction is a key 
influencer of the cost-optimal policy. Regarding shortages (reliability criterion), more inspection leads 
to less loss of supply, and shortages are least when defect induction is least. 
 
 
Figure 4. Cost-rate as a function of M. (a) r varying, r=0.1 (▬▬), r=0.05 (---), r=0.04 (- - -), r=0.03  
(_ . _), r=0.01 (─ ─), r=0 (_.._). (b) w varying, w=0.1 (▬▬), w=0.05 (---), w=0.03 (_ . _), w=0.01 (─ ─), 
w=0 (_.._). (c) q varying, q=0.5 (▬▬), q=0.3 (---), q=0.1 (_ . _) , q=0.05 (─ ─), q=0 (_.._). (d) p varying, 
p=0.2 (▬▬), p=0.15 (---), p=0.1 (_ . _), p=0.05 (─ ─), p=0 (_.._). 
When we consider a policy that ignores defects, true or false (lines 17-20), we again see a 
polarization of ABR and PI, but that when inspection is preferred (smaller r) it is more frequent 
(smaller T), and the cost-rate is larger (compare 8 with 19). These observations affirm those of 
Cavalcante et al. (2011) regarding the efficacy of a policy that allows detection of a defective state. 
Our final point relates to perfect inspection (line 21) and perfect maintenance (line 22).  In both cases, 
the MT policy is cost-optimal. However, a more interesting overall observation is how dramatic is the 
effect of imperfection (low quality)—the cost-rate for the base case is more than double. This 
demonstrates that quality of maintenance has a very significant impact on cost (and losses).  
Finally we note that when the optimal MT policy warrants inspections, MT is large, allowing 
fuller use of component lives. 
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3.3.2 The utility of the general model 
The aspects of maintenance quality considered in our model have already been addressed separately in 
other studies. The uniqueness of our study lies in considering these aspects together. Then the extent 
to which simpler models provide poorer guidance for maintainers can be studied.  
In Table 2 we present the marginal increased cost of implementing a sub-optimal policy. The base 
line cost-rate is the cost-rate of the optimal policy ( *, *)M T  under the full model. The full model 
accounts for all aspects of maintenance quality. We then assume a reduced model (that omits an 
aspect of maintenance quality) and determine the optimal policy ( , )M T   under this reduced model. 
We then calculate the cost-rate considering all aspects of maintenance quality (full model) at ( , )M T  . 
The marginal increased cost (100 { ( , ) ( *, *)}/ ( *, *)C M T C M T C M T     %) is then termed the 
“cost of ignorance”.  
 
Table 2. Marginal increased cost of sub-optimal policies 
 Model assumed       
    Quality parameters  Cost-optimal policy under 
the reduced model 
 
 Cost-rate and 
loss-rate of 
policy under 
full model 
 Cost of 
ignorance 
% 
   p w q r  M T  C∞ Sh∞  C∞ Sh∞   
 Full model  0.10 0.05 0.3 0.05  1 0.785  1.856 1.659  1.856 1.659  0 
R
ed
u
ced
  
m
o
d
els 
No heterogeneity  0 0.05 0.3 0.05  1 1.239  1.072 1.419  2.404 1.464  29.5% 
No defect induction  0.1 0.05 0.3 0  17 0.178  1.051 1.288  2.034 1.384  9.6% 
No classification errors  0.1 0 0 0.05  25 0.146  1.656 1.295  2.032 1.413  9.5% 
Perfect inspection  0.1 0 0 0  20 0.164  0.818 1.197  2.026 1.393  9.2% 
Perfect maintenance  0 0 0 0  15 0.192  0.749 1.201  2.049 1.376  10.4% 
 
Ignoring heterogeneity is the most costly (29.5%). Ignoring classification errors and induced 
defects is less costly (about 10%). Interestingly, complete ignorance (assuming perfect maintenance) 
is much less costly than ignoring heterogeneity alone. This is because for the former the policy 
recommends inspection, and inspections are useful to deal with early defects due weak items. In 
addition, complete ignorance of inspection quality and ignorance of defect induction or classification 
errors cost approximately the same. This is because, in each case, the recommended policy is frequent 
inspection, thus mitigating for component heterogeneity. 
3.3.3 Investing in higher quality maintenance 
Maintenance quality can be improved in various ways, e.g. through staff training and development 
and use of new supportive technology. In general, quality improvement requires investment, and in 
Table 3 we highlight where investments may be beneficial. Thus, comparing the base case (line 1) 
with cases in which the defect classification accuracy is improved (lines 2 and 3), we see that a 25% 
increase in the cost of inspection ( Ic ) to reduce w by 80% is worthwhile (since the cost-rate is smaller 
for line 2 than line 1), but a 50% increase is not. Regarding defect induction, investment is more 
beneficial (lines 1 and lines 4-6), where broadly a 100% increase in Ic  is worthwhile to achieve a 50% 
reduction in r.  
Other effects can be observed. To reduce p (heterogeneity) requires investment in replacements 
(through Gc  etc). A 10% increase in replacement cost is worthwhile to achieve a 50% reduction in 
heterogeneity but not 20% (lines 11, 12). This analysis is brief, but the scope for determining where to 
invest or for supporting a case for investment is demonstrated. Broadly, investment in reducing defect 
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induction is the most cost-effective investment. The loss-rate effects are broadly to the contrary and so 
this indeed provides a useful additional criterion to guide decision-making. 
 
Table 3. An analysis of the benefit of investment in higher quality maintenance.  
  Quality parameters Costs Optimum policy 
 Case p w q r Ic  Gc  Dc  Fc  M T MT C∞ Sh∞ 
1 Base case 0.10 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.04 1 1.40 2 1 0.785 0.785 1.856 1.659 
2 Improve classification 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.05 1 1.40 2 24 0.151 3.624 1.816 1.314 
3 Improve classification 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.06 1 1.40 2 21 0.161 3.381 1.879 1.312 
4 Reduce defect induction 0.10 0.05 0.30 0.01 0.06 1 1.40 2 15 0.192 2.880 1.359 1.305 
5 Reduce defect induction 0.10 0.05 0.30 0.01 0.08 1 1.40 2 13 0.211 2.743 1.457 1.303 
6 Reduce defect induction 0.10 0.05 0.30 0.02 0.08 1 1.40 2 13 0.207 2.691 1.662 1.324 
7 Reduce defect induction 0.10 0.05 0.30 0.03 0.08 1 1.40 2 13 0.203 2.639 1.864 1.344 
8 Improve inspection 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12 1 1.40 2 11 0.244 2.684 1.448 1.251 
9 Improve inspection 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.12 1 1.40 2 12 0.229 2.748 1.645 1.263 
10 Improve inspection 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.12 1 1.40 2 12 0.224 2.688 1.837 1.281 
11 Reduce weak items 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.04 1.10 1.54 2.20 1 0.954 0.954 1.670 1.546 
12 Reduce weak items 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.04 1.50 2.10 3 1 1.042 1.042 2.082 1.506 
13 Joint improvement 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12 1.50 2.10 3 11 0.255 2.805 1.648 1.237 
14 Joint improvement 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.12 1.50 2.10 3 11 0.251 2.761 1.867 1.253 
15 Joint improvement 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.12 1.50 2.10 3 12 0.238 2.856 2.084 1.263 
16 Joint improvement 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12 2 2.80 4 12 0.251 3.012 1.903 1.228 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we study a mixed policy of inspection and preventive replacement for a single-
component protection system. Failures of the system are modelled with the delay time concept. 
Component lifetimes (specifically times to defect arrival) arise from a mixture distribution 
(heterogeneity). The system is inspected to determine its state, and an inspection may classify a good 
system as defective (false positive) and a defective system as good (false negative) (misclassification 
errors). An inspection may itself change the state of the system from good to defective (defect 
induction). These aspects of maintenance quality (heterogeneity, misclassification, defect induction) 
are parameterized, and their effects upon the cost-rate and the production loss-rate of a near-periodic 
inspection and replacement policy are studied. Isolation valves in a water distribution system motivate 
the analysis. There are important implications for practice because the model provides decision 
support for prioritizing quality improvement. 
During the data collection for the case study, engineers recognized defect induction and 
misclassification as significant concerns, but their extent was unknown. We quantify these, and find 
that reducing defect induction is the priority for investment, although this in conjunction with the 
reduction of misclassification has even greater benefit. This demonstrates the value of the model we 
develop. 
Careful estimation of quality parameters is required to make full use of our model. Methods for 
elicitation of maintenance modelling parameters exist, e.g. snapshot modelling (Christer and 
Whitelaw, 1983), interval method (Beraldi et al., 2013), but there are difficulties not least because the 
elicitation of quality parameters is equivalent to asking maintainers to how well they do their job. In 
relation to this, the quality parameters in our model may be suitable performance indicators for a 
third-party maintenance contract (Brito et al., 2010). Finally, for multiple protection systems with 
varying criticalities in a network, investment prioritization would need to consider not only broad 
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quality improvement but also targeted interventions for the most critical systems (Scarf and Martin, 
2001). 
The model has been developed for protection systems like valves, whose operation is binary (e.g. 
open or closed). It may be interesting, in future work, to develop corresponding models for protection 
systems that may provide partial protection, as a result of deterioration of the protection system, in the 
event of a demand. 
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